Adjusting a Criminal Defendant's Sentence
After a Successful Collateral Attack
Sanford I. Weisburstt
Suppose a police officer, after an undercover drug buy in an
apartment, obtains and executes a search warrant and finds a
bag of narcotics and a firearm inside a locked trunk in the closet.
The drug dealer, in exchange for the prosecutor's promise to drop
a conspiracy count, pleads guilty to one count of possession of
narcotics with intent to distribute and one count of using a firearm in relation to a drug trafficking offense. Next, the court sentences the defendant to prison. While in prison, the defendant
discovers that the Supreme Court has issued a new, narrow interpretation of the "use of a firearm" statute, and the defendant
concludes that his storage of the firearm in a locked trunk
probably does not satisfy this new definition of "use." The defendant then moves that the district court vacate his conviction on
the "use of a firearm" count. The government, while conceding
that the conviction on the "use" count should be vacated, requests
that the court enhance the defendant's sentence on the remaining, valid drug distribution count, for which possession of a firearm is an aggravating factor.
In the wake of Bailey v United States, in which the Supreme
Court issued a new, narrow definition of "use" of a firearm,'
courts have disagreed on how to adjust a defendant's remaining
sentence after a successful collateral attack.2 Two adjustment
schemes are potentially available when the defendant's convictions were the product of a plea agreement:3 the court could resentence the defendant on the remaining valid counts, or it could
allow the government to reinstate the original indictment.4
t A.B. 1995, Harvard University; J.D. Candidate 1998, The University of Chicago.
' 116 S Ct 501, 509 (1995) (prosecutor must show "active employment" of the firearm).

2 Compare, for example, United States v Mata, 1996 US Dist LEXIS 16780, *8-10

(S D NY) (holding that the sentence on defendant's remaining count can be enhanced)
(collecting cases), with Warner v United States, 926 F Supp 1387, 1392 (E D Ark 1996)
(holding that the sentence on defendant's remaining count cannot be enhanced).
A third potential approach would be for the court to leave the defendant's remaining sentence intact.
' When the defendant's convictions were the product of a trial, only the resentencing
mechanism is available because there is no legal theory on which to base a remedy of reinstating the original indictment. When the defendant's sole conviction was the product of
a plea agreement and was vacated on collateral attack, the resentencing option is un-
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Courts have evaluated the permissibility of these adjustment
mechanisms using such legal tools as contract law, the court's jurisdiction, the Double Jeopardy Clause, and the Due Process
Clause. Yet these legal doctrines do not definitively resolve the
question of how the criminal justice system can permissibly dispose of a defendant who succeeds in collaterally attacking a conviction based on a change in the law.
Accordingly, courts need a persuasive reason to construe the
legal doctrines in a certain way. Two competing interests must be
reconciled. Society has an interest in punishing criminals proportionately to their conduct,5 an interest potentially frustrated by a
defendant's successful collateral attack. On the other hand, defendants have an interest in avoiding an adjustment of their sentence after a successful collateral attack. Weighing these interests, this Comment concludes that courts should allow flexible
adjustment of defendants' sentences, in the form of either resentencing or reinstating the original indictment. This option provides defendants with the benefit of the change in the law but
prevents them from receiving an unjustified windfall. At the
same time, this option protects society because, without such an
adjustment of the defendant's sentence, conduct that the law still
deems culpable may go unpunished.
This Comment examines the broader implications of adjusting a criminal defendant's sentence after a change in the substantive criminal law by focusing on specific issues relating to
Bailey's aftermath. Part I sets forth the basic framework of the
United States Sentencing Guidelines, provides a brief history of
the Bailey decision, and introduces the statute that allows a federal prisoner to collaterally attack his sentence. Part II applies
contract law principles to the case of a defendant who entered a
plea agreement and then succeeded in vacating one of his counts.
Part III examines the permissibility of resentencing on remaining counts, and Part IV evaluates the permissibility of reinstating the original indictment. Part V attempts to supplement the
applicable legal doctrine, which is somewhat open-ended, by considering the implications of different "sentence adjustment" rules

available because there are no remaining counts to enhance.
This Comment assumes that the sentencing schedule promulgated by the United
States Sentencing Commission, and the mandatory minimum consecutive sentences for
violations of criminal statutes enacted by Congress, such as 18 USC § 924(c) (five-year
minimum for use or possession of a gun during a violent or drug trafficking crime), reflect
society's view of how much punishment should attach to differing degrees of criminal
conduct.
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in light of various theories of punishment. This Part also discusses the types of plea agreements prosecutors and defendants
would have made if they had considered the possibility of a shift
in the law.

I. CONVICTION, STATUTORY REINTERPRETATION, AND RELIEF
Before embarking on a discussion of what happens after a
defendant succeeds in a collateral attack, it is helpful to consider
the steps in the process leading up to the collateral attack stage.
This Part puts the post-Bailey relief issue in context by introducing the relevant sentencing guideline provisions, summarizing the change in the law effected by Bailey, and exploring the
typical defendant's opportunities for relief.
A. An Either/Or Relationship in the Sentencing Guidelines
The United States Sentencing Guidelines6 ("Guidelines")
create a fairly mechanical sentencing process. First, the judge
uses Appendix A of the Guidelines to match the defendant's conviction to a base offense level and adjusts up or down for any specific offense or victim characteristics as the Guidelines direct.'
When the conviction includes multiple counts, counts involving
substantially the same harm are sorted into distinct groups and
plugged into a combined offense table to determine the combined
offense level.8 Second, the judge determines the defendant's
criminal history category and makes any applicable adjustments.9 Third, the judge plugs the base offense level and the
criminal history category into the sentencing table, and the table
indicates the sentencing range (in months)." Finally, the judge
' The Guidelines were enacted pursuant to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub L
No 98-473, 98 Stat 1987, codified at 18 USC §§ 3551-673, 28 USC §§ 991-98 (1994). The
Guidelines became effective on November 1, 1987, see 18 USC § 3551 note (1994); Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, Ch 1, Pt A(2) (West 1995) ("USSG"), and apply to offenders who
commit crimes on or after that date. Continuing Appropriations, 1985-Comprehensive
Crime Control Act of 1984, S Rep No 98-225, 98th Cong, 1st Sess 189 (1983), reprinted in
1984 USCCAN 3182, 3372.
7 USSG § 1B1.1(a). The procedure for calculating the offense level is slightly more
complicated where the plea establishes facts that would support conviction for a more serious offense than the one agreed to. In such a case, the court is to apply the Guideline
most applicable to the more serious offense or offenses established. USSG § 101.2, commentary (n 1). For a more detailed description of the way the Guidelines are applied, see
Project, Twenty-Fifth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: United States Supreme
Court and Courts ofAppeals 1994-1995, 84 Georgetown L J 713, 1261-1309 (1996).
'
USSG § 3D1.4-4.
' USSG § 1B.l(f).
10

USSG § 1B1.1(g).
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chooses from within this range and imposes the sentence."
The specific guideline at issue in the post-Bailey cases, 2
§ 2D1.1(b)(1), concerns a "specific offense characteristic" enhancement of the base offense level. It provides that, "[i]f a dangerous weapon (including a firearm) was possessed" during the
commission of the offense, the sentencing judge is to "increase
[the base offense level] by 2 levels."3 However, a defendant cannot receive both the § 2D1.1(b)(1) enhancement and an 18 USC
§ 924(c)(1) (use of a firearm in a drug offense)'4 conviction because that would constitute double counting-that is, the defendant would be punished twice for the same conduct of using or
possessing a firearm." Thus, the prosecutor faces a choice between seeking a § 924(c)(1) conviction or a § 2D1.1(b)(1) enhancement on the predicate drug counts. Because a § 924(c)(1)
conviction carries with it a more severe penalty than a
§ 2D1.1(b)(1) enhancement, prosecutors are likely to seek a
§ 924(c)(1) conviction. 6
B. A Change in Statutory Interpretation: The Meaning of "Use"
The substantial drug problems present in the United States,
in conjunction with the pervasive association between firearms
and drug transactions, 7 suggest the importance of § 924(c)(1) to
the federal criminal law. s Section 924(c)(1) punishes a defendant
who "in relation to any... drug trafficking crime... uses.., a
" USSG § 1B.l(i) (The judge is to look "to any other policy statements or commentary in the guidelines that might warrant consideration in imposing sentence.").
12 See, for example, Woodhouse v United States, 934 F Supp 1008, 1010 (C D M1l
1996).
USSG § 2D1.1(b)(1).
18 USC § 924(c)(1) imposes a five-year minimum term of imprisonment upon a person who "during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime ... uses
or carries a firearm." This five-year term must be served consecutively to any other sentence the defendant receives. 18 USC § 924(c)(1) (1994). Other statutes that require the
term of imprisonment to run consecutively to any other term of imprisonment are 18
USC § 844(h) (1994) (use or possession of an explosive during commission of a felony),
and 18 USC § 929(a)-(b) (1994) (use or possession of a firearm along with possession of
armor-piercing ammunition).
" USSG § 2K2.4, commentary (n 1, backg'd); Woodhouse, 934 F Supp at 1010.
1" See, for example, Warner v United States, 926 F Supp 1387, 1390 (E D Ark 1996)
(§ 924(c)(1) utilized rather than § 2D1.lb(1) enhancement in original pre-Bailey prosecution); Woodhouse, 934 F Supp at 1009 (same); Beal v United States, 924 F Supp 913, 914
(D Minn 1996) (same); Rodriguez v United States, 933 F Supp 279, 280 (S D NY 1996)

(same).

17 See Lawrence M. Friedman, Crime and Punishment in American History 457-64
(Basic 1993).
1 Its importance is reflected in the Supreme Court's decision to accept two cases in
the past decade relating to the interpretation of § 924(c). See Bailey, 116 S Ct at 501;
Smith v UnitedStates, 508 US 223 (1993).
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firearm." Before 1995, the circuit courts of appeals tended to construe "use" broadly, encompassing mere possession of a firearm. 9
Thus, many defendants who had not actively employed a firearm
were convicted of violating § 924(c)(1).
In 1995, the Supreme Court in Bailey adopted a narrow interpretation of "use" that requires "active employment" of a firearm, such as "brandishing, displaying, bartering, striking with,
and most obviously, firing or attempting to fire a firearm."" Because many of the defendants convicted prior to Bailey had not
actively employed a firearm, they had not violated § 924(c)(1) as
interpreted by the Supreme Court in Bailey. Notably, however,
the Supreme Court distinguished the conduct that would support
a § 924(c)(1) conviction, "active employment" of a firearm,
from the conduct that would support an enhancement under
§ 2D1.1(b)(1) of the Guidelines, requiring only that a "firearm
was possessed during the offense."2'
C. Relief for Defendants Convicted Under the '2erePossession"
Standard
Understandably, defendants have tried to avail themselves
of the new interpretation of § 924(c)(1).22 The primary avenue'
for relief is 28 USC § 2255: it essentially allows a "prisoner in
" Although these courts did not uniformly adopt the very broad "mere possession"
approach (the D.C. Circuit required a connection with the drug offense), none adopted the
"active employment" standard later selected by the Supreme Court. See United States v
Torres-Rodriguez,930 F2d 1375, 1385 (9th Cir 1991) (mere possession sufficient to satisfy
§ 924(c)(1)); United States v Brett, 872 F2d 1365, 1370-71 (8th Cir 1989) (same); United
States v Bailey, 995 F2d 1113, 1116 (DC Cir 1993) (prosecutor must prove possession and
"a connection between the firearm and an underlying drug offense"), revd, 116 S Ct 501,
506 (1995). But see United States v Feliz-Cordero, 859 F2d 250, 254 (2d Cir 1988)
(presence of gun in dresser drawer in apartment with drugs held insufficient to satisfy
§ 924(c)(1)).
Bailey, 116 S Ct at 508. The Court did not, however, issue a definitive interpretation of the word "carries," which also appears in the language of§ 924(c)(1).
21 Bailey, 116 S Ct at 509.
" Due to the widespread use of § 924(c)(1) by prosecutors, many defendants now find
themselves in this situation after Bailey. For example, in the District of Columbia, the
Public Defender's Office is handling over two hundred cases in which relief may be warranted in light of Bailey. United States v Jefferson, 1996 WL 694176, *1 (D DC).
' Other avenues for obtaining relief exist, but are limited in their availability. A defendant might appeal his § 924(c)(1) conviction on grounds of erroneous jury instruction
and insufficient evidence; however, because the defendant must file a notice of appeal
within ten days after the entry of the judgment, see FRAP 4(b), this outlet will aid only
those defendants convicted no earlier than ten days before the Supreme Court decided
Bailey. A defendant who appealed his § 924(c)(1) conviction before Bailey might file a petition for rehearing, but the fourteen-day time limit after entry of judgment, see FRAP
40(a), similarly limits the availability of this option.
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custody" to ask the sentencing court to "vacate, set aside, or correct" an illegal sentence. 24 Although § 2255 requires that a defendant make his motion within one year of the date on which the
Supreme Court initially recognized a new "right,"' this time
limit is much more generous than are the time limits for filing a
26
notice of appeal or a petition for rehearing.
A defendant who failed to raise the argument on appeal that
he now seeks to make in a § 2255 motion faces the substantial
hurdle of showing (1) "cause" excusing the defendant's failure to
raise the issue on direct appeal, and (2) "actual prejudice" resulting from the error.2 7 Most courts have held that "cause" and
"prejudice" exist in the post-Bailey scenario because appeal
would have been futile in light of existing precedent and because
the new interpretation of § 924(c)(1) renders the conviction unsupported by sufficient evidence." The government and most
courts proceed on the unstated assumption that Bailey is retroactive to defendants whose convictions have become final, an as28 USCA § 2255 (West 1996).
Id. Section 2255 was extensively amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996, Pub L No 104-132, 110 Stat 1214, 1220-21 (1996). Under the old version of § 2255, there was no time limit. 28 USC § 2255 (1994) ("A motion for such relief
may be made at any time."). Also, the old version of § 2255 did not distinguish between
initial and successive motions for relief. The new § 2255 imposes stringent requirements
on a successive motion, requiring that such a motion be certified by a panel of the appropriate court of appeals to contain either:
(1) newly discovered evidence that, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a
whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable factfinder would have found the movant guilty of the offense; or (2) a new
rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.
28 USCA § 2255. Several courts of appeals have determined that Bailey did not express a
rule of constitutional law, but rather was merely an interpretation of a substantive
criminal statute. Accordingly, these courts have held that a prisoner is not entitled to
make a successive motion on grounds of the Bailey decision. See, for example, In re
Blackshire, 98 F3d 1293, 1294 (11th Cir 1996); In re Tolliver, 97 F3d 89, 90 (5th Cir 1996).
"See note 23. In contrast to an appeal, in which any error of law is cognizable, § 2255
generally recognizes only violations of federal law that involve a "fundamental defect"
causing a "complete miscarriage" of justice. Davis v United States, 417 US 333, 346
(1974), quoting Hill v United States, 368 US 424, 428 (1962). See also Review of Criminal
Procedure, 84 Georgetown L J at 1453-55 nn 2832-33 (cited in note 7).
' Beal v United States, 924 F Supp 913, 915 (D Minn 1996), citing United States v
Frady, 456 US 152, 167-68 (1982); Dalton v United States, 862 F2d 1307, 1309 (8th Cir
1988).
See, for example, Beal, 924 F Supp at 915; United States v Barnhardt,93 F3d 706,
708 (10th Cir 1996) (holding that defendant who pled guilty to a § 924(c)(1) count and
thus did not appeal could make a § 2255 motion in light of the intervening change in the
law effected by Bailey). But see Bousley v Brooks, 97 F3d 284, 287 (8th Cir 1996) (holding
that Bailey "does not resurrect a challenge to a section 924(c) conviction that has been
procedurally defaulted").
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sumption that seems justified given that Bailey announces a new
interpretation of a substantive criminal statute, rather than a
new rule of criminal procedure.29
Once the defendant succeeds in his § 2255 motion,"0 the court
vacates the sentence associated with the § 924(c)(1) count. This
results in a five-year decrease in the defendant's aggregate sentence, given that the five-year § 924(c)(1) sentence must be
served consecutively to, rather than concurrently with, sentences
for other counts.3 '
Where the defendant's convictions were the product of a plea
agreement, two "sentence adjustment" mechanisms are potentially available to the government: 2 first, the government could
request that the court apply the § 2D1.1(b)(1) enhancement to
the remaining counts;" or second, the government could attempt
to reinstate the original indictment. 4 The next three Parts of this
Comment evaluate the legal permissibility of these mechanisms.
II.

RIGHTS UNDER THE PLEA AGREEMENT AND BACKGROUND
CONTRACT LAW

Prosecutors who want to resentence on remaining counts or
reinstate an original indictment have a number of different arSee, for example, United States v Turner, 914 F Supp 48, 48-50 (W D NY 1996)
(holding that Teague v Lane, 489 US 288 (1989) and its progeny concern changes in procedural law, and therefore leave intact the rule of Davis v United States, 417 US 333, 346
(1974), that certain changed interpretations of substantive criminal statutes may be applied retroactively). This result is supported by cases involving changed interpretations of
statutes other than the one at issue in Bailey. See, for example, United States v McKie, 73
F3d 1149, 1150-52 (DC Cir 1996) (21 USC § 844(a)); United States v Dashney, 52 F3d 298,
298-99 (10th Cir 1995) (31 USC §§ 5322(a), 5324(3)).
' The government often concedes the vacatur of the § 924(c)(1) count where the evidence clearly did not show active employment of the firearm. See, for example, Woodhouse v United States, 934 F Supp 1008, 1010 (C D Ill 1996). Sometimes, the court accepts the defendant's argument despite the government's opposition. See, for example,
United States v Cushenberry, 1996 US Dist LEXIS 13315, *7 (E D La) (government argued that the defendant deliberately "displayed" guns as part of a drug trafficking crime).
1 See note 14.
The government also could decline to attempt to adjust the defendant's remaining
sentence. This presents no problem from the standpoint of legal permissibility, for in our
adversarial system, the government prosecutor has wide discretion in deciding not to
prosecute a defendant.
' The absence of the § 924(c)(1) count means that the double-counting problem has
disappeared. This resentencing adjustment mechanism is feasible (disregarding legal obstacles for the moment) only if there is a remaining count to enhance. Thus, where a plea
agreement resulted in only a § 924(c)(1) conviction, the government must either "do
nothing" or look to the "reinstatement" adjustment mechanism.
"Where the now-vacated § 924(c)(1) count resulted from a conviction at trial rather
than a plea agreement, the reinstatement option would be unavailable because it rests on
principles of contract law that are used to interpret plea agreements.
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guments at their disposal. Regarding resentencing, if the prosecutor's only obligation under the plea agreement was to dismiss
certain counts, as is likely the case, then the prosecutor is free,
within the terms of the plea agreement, to seek a sentence enhancement on the remaining counts. Thus, the terms of the plea
agreement and contract law pose no hurdle to the resentencing
remedy in most cases. 5
Regarding reinstatement of the indictment, the terms of the
plea agreement and background contract law provide more of an
obstacle, for in the typical plea agreement in the post-Bailey
cases the prosecutor has explicitly promised to dismiss certain
charges. To reinstate the dismissed charges, then, the prosecutor
must establish why he should no longer be bound by the earlier
promise. The prosecutor could argue that the defendant's successful § 2255 motion breached the plea agreement, thus releasing the prosecutor from his earlier promise to drop certain
counts. Alternatively, the prosecutor could argue that under the
contract doctrine of impossibility, the defendant should be excused from his promise to serve the § 924(c)(1) sentence but that
the rights and duties of the parties need to be equitably adjusted
in light of an unforeseen change in the law. As this Part will
demonstrate, contract law leads to a rejection of the "breach" argument but fails to provide much guidance on the permissibility
of reinstatement as an equitable remedy. Before turning to the
cases, a brief introduction to plea agreements helps frame the issues.
A. Plea Agreements: An Introduction
When the defendant and the prosecutor enter a plea agreement, the defendant promises to plead guilty to certain counts in
exchange for a prosecutor's promise to help the defendant in
some way, such as by moving to dismiss other counts that otherwise would have been litigated at the defendant's trial." Although the court is prohibited from participating in plea negotia-

' See Part I for a discussion of whether resentencing comports with statutory and
constitutional doctrine.
' Other types of promises might be made by defendant and prosecutor. The defendant might promise to assist the prosecutor by testifying against another defendant. The
prosecutor might promise to make a certain sentencing recommendation to the judge,
agree not to oppose the defendant's request for a particular sentence, or agree that a specific sentence is appropriate for the disposition of the case. Review of CriminalProcedure,
84 Georgetown L J at 1040 (cited in note 7).
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tions the court decides whether to accept or reject the plea
agreement."8 A plea agreement is governed by the law of contracts, 9 and if the defendant breaches the plea agreement, the
government is free to reprosecute the defendant.4"
Plea agreements play a pervasive role in our criminal justice
system. Nearly 90 percent of all federal criminal cases involve
guilty pleas and many of these cases involve some form of plea
agreement. 4 Because plea agreements are so prevalent, it is important to devise an appropriate method of interpreting plea
agreements after a supervening change in the law.
B. Incorrect Applications of Contract Doctrine
Some courts have incorrectly applied contract law in cases
involving collateral attacks based on changes in a substantive
criminal law. Errors include treating the defendant's failure to
appeal as a procedural default and treating the collateral attack
as a breach of contract.
1. Failure to appeal as a procedural default.
The first misapplication of contract law treats the defendant's failure to appeal his "pleaded" conviction as a procedural
default of the right to later collaterally attack the conviction in
FRCrP 11(e)(1).
' FRCrP 11(e)(3)-(4). The court must determine that the plea was voluntary, ensure
that there is a factual basis for the plea, and address the defendant in open court before
accepting the plea agreement. FRCrP 11(f)-(g).
See Review of Criminal Procedure, 84 Georgetown L J at 1041 & n 1341 (cited in
note 7) (collecting cases).
4 Ricketts v Adamson, 483 US 1, 9-12 (1987) (agreement void and government allowed to reinstate original charges when defendant breached promise to testify at codefendant's trial). In Ricketts, the defendant had promised in the plea agreement to testify
against certain codefendants. Id at 3. The defendant subsequently refused to testify, asserting that his obligation to testify terminated upon his sentencing. Id at 4. The state
court construed the defendant's failure to testify as a breach, and the United States Supreme Court deferred to the state court's determination of this issue. Id at 5-6 n 3. Thus,
while Ricketts provides guidance on the legally permissible consequences of a breach, it
does not suggest how to discern whether a breach has occurred.
41 USSG, Ch 1, Pt A(4)(c). For a scholarly debate over the merits of plea agreements,
compare Frank H. Easterbrook, PleaBargainingas Compromise, 101 Yale L J 1969, 1975
(1992) (defending plea bargaining as a less costly and more efficient solution than trial),
with Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea Bargainingas Disaster,101 Yale L J 1979, 1998 (1992)
(criticizing plea agreements as plagued by an absence of monitoring mechanisms, a failure to internalize the social effects of punishment, and a divergence of interests between
attorneys and their principals). For a critical discussion of the history of plea bargaining,
see Albert W. Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History, 79 Colum L Rev 1 (1979)
(concluding that plea bargaining was essentially unknown during most of the history of
the common law).
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light of a subsequent change in the law. In Bousley v Brooks, 2
the Eighth Circuit held that the defendant had procedurally defaulted his § 2255 motion by failing to challenge on appeal the
pre-Bailey "mere possession" standard that the parties had relied
on during plea agreement negotiations.' Because of this earlier
procedural default, the court did not reach the merits of the defendant's motion to vacate his § 924(c)(1) conviction. Thus, the
court did not reach the propriety of allowing the government to
resentence on the remaining counts or to reinstate the counts it
had dismissed pursuant to the plea agreement. The court reasoned that the plea agreement had involved a carefully balanced
negotiation leading to the defendant's guilty plea in exchange for
the right to contest at sentencing the amount of narcotics for
which he would be held accountable. 44 Further, the sentencing
court had "meticulously advised" the defendant that a guilty plea
would foreclose an appeal of his conviction and waive the defendant's right to a jury trial; hence, the defendant's plea was not
involuntary. 45 The court therefore held that the defendant had
implicitly waived his right to collaterally attack the § 924(c)(1)
conviction that resulted from this evenly negotiated plea agreement.

46

The Eighth Circuit's approach is incorrect because the court
neglected to consider the contract doctrine of impossibility of performance. This doctrine has been applied in some post-Bailey
cases.4 7 In ordinary contract cases, this doctrine discharges a
promisor from his obligation to perform when that "performance
is made impracticable, without his fault, by the occurrence of an
event the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on
which the contract was made." In this case, the unexpected shift
in interpretation of § 924(c)(1) provides both "cause" for failing to
appeal and impracticability of performance of the § 924(c)(1) sentence insofar as one cannot lawfully "perform" a sentence for
conduct no longer deemed criminal.
97 F3d 284 (8th Cir 1996).
Id at 287.
T
Id at 287-88.
,Id at 288.
Id at 289. The court also observed, however, that a defendant's guilty plea and failure to appeal would not have constituted a procedural default of his right to collaterally
attack his conviction upon a showing of cause and prejudice. Id at 288.
' See, for example, Rodriguez v United States, 933 F Supp 279, 282-83 (S D NY
1996); United States v Gaither,926 F Supp 50, 52 (M D Pa 1996).
"Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 261 (1979). See also UCC § 2-615(a) (same);
Restatement (Second) of Contracts at § 264 (discharge of obligation permissible when performance made impracticable by a supervening governmental regulation or order).
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However, the impossibility doctrine does not always discharge the promisor from his obligation to perform, leaving the
loss where it falls. Rather, it is often necessary to adjust the
rights of the parties "on such terms as justice requires."4 9 But because there are two competing interests implicated in this context, it is not clear what justice requires. Society has an interest
in punishing criminals proportionately for their culpable conduct.
On the other hand, the defendant has an interest in avoiding an
upward adjustment of the sentence that remains after his successful collateral attack. The impossibility doctrine neither indicates which of these interests should prevail nor suggests a way
to balance them.
2. Collateral attack as a breach of the plea agreement.
A second erroneous application of contract law views a defendant's collateral attack as a breach of the plea agreement. In
United States v Viera, ° the defendant had executed a plea
agreement whereby he agreed to plead guilty to a § 924(c)(1)
count in exchange for the government's dismissal of other
counts. 1 The agreement was silent as to whether the defendant
could appeal or collaterally attack his conviction or sentence.2
The defendant began serving his five-year prison sentence, and
after Bailey was decided, the defendant made a § 2255 motion to
vacate his § 924(c)(1) conviction." The court agreed with the defendant that the facts described in the plea agreement did not
support a § 924(c)(1) conviction in light of Bailey. 4
However, the court characterized the defendant's motion as
a breach of his plea agreement.5 5 Purporting to interpret the plea
agreement under principles of contract law, the court held that
the defendant had breached an implicit term in the agreement
" Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 272(2) (1979). See generally John D. Calamari
and Joseph M. Perillo, The Law of Contracts§ 13-23 at 577-79 (West 3d ed 1987).
931 F Supp 1224 (M D Pa 1996).
51 Id at 1226.
Id. The agreement contained a merger clause stating that there were no other written or oral agreements and that no other promises had been made to the defendant. Id. A
merger clause has been defined as "a clause in the instrument that states that the writing is a final expression of all the terms agreed upon and is a complete and exclusive
statement of those terms." Calamari and Perillo, The Law of Contracts §§ 3-6 at 156
(citation omitted) (cited in note 49).
Viera, 931 F Supp at 1226.
' Id at 1227. The defendant had admitted that he kept both a gun and cocaine intended for sale in his bedroom, which would not violate the "use" statute under the
Coures interpretation in Bailey. Viera, 931 F Supp at 1226-27.
Viera, 931 F Supp at 1228.
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central to the parties' reasonable expectations-that the defendant would neither appeal nor collaterally attack his conviction. 6
The Viera court erred in its application of contract law principles. Although the parties may have reasonably expected that
the defendant would not appeal or collaterally attack the conviction in the absence of an unforeseen change in the law, the law
did change in an unexpected manner. Precedent had been nearly
uniform prior to Bailey,"5 and thus it is unlikely that either the
prosecutor or the defendant was cognizant of a risk that the law
would change. Thus, the "non-occurrence" of a change in the law
was an unspoken assumption of the plea agreement and the impossibility doctrine should have applied to excuse the defendant
from serving the remainder of his § 924(c)(1) sentence. However,
as noted above, the impossibility doctrine gives little guidance at
the remedial stage, suggesting obliquely that the rights and duties of the parties should be adjusted "on such terms as justice
requires.""
III.

PERMISSIBILITY OF RESENTENCING ON REMAINING
VALID COUNTS

Contract law poses no obstacle to the resentencing option
and leaves the reinstatement option on the table so long as it
comports with "justice." Yet principles of contract law do not pose
the only hurdles to the resentencing and reinstatement remedies.
This Part investigates possible jurisdictional, double jeopardy,
and due process challenges to the adjustment mechanism of resentencing on remaining counts." Obstacles to the reinstatement
mechanism will be considered in Part IV.
A. Jurisdiction
A court must have express statutory authorization to modify
an imposed term of imprisonment.6 Although § 2255 provides
authorization to vacate the challenged count, jurisdiction over
"Id.

, The court held that the proper remedy for defendant's breach would be for the gov-

ernment to be allowed to reinstate the original indictment. Id at 1229. As Part lV argues,
this is the correct result. Thus, the Viera court erred in its approach, but not in its ultimate resolution.
See note 19.
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 272(2).
While the analysis continues to focus on convictions resulting from a plea agreement, the reader should note that this discussion of resentencing applies equally in the
case of convictions resulting from a trial.
18 USC § 3582(c) (1994).
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the remaining counts is less clear.62 To resentence on those
counts, the court must have jurisdiction over them, because resentencing is an act of the court.
Much of the uncertainty regarding courts' jurisdiction over
the remaining counts stems from disagreement about the meaning of "sentence" in § 2255.63 Some courts permit resentencing on
the ground that the interdependent relationship between the
§ 924(c)(1) count and the other counts created a "sentencing
package" such that the defendant received one comprehensive
sentence for all of his counts." Other courts refuse to permit resentencing on the ground that a multi-count conviction produces
independent sentences for each count.65 Thus, the definition of
"sentence" is important because, if the defendant receives one
aggregate sentence on all of his counts, then by challenging one
count he has challenged that aggregate sentence and may have
placed the entire package within the court's jurisdiction.6 6 On the
other hand, if the defendant's sentences are properly viewed in
isolation, then the defendant has only placed the sentence he is
challenging within the court's jurisdiction.

' The relevant language of § 2255 was enacted in 1948, see 62 Stat 967-68 (1948), before the enactment of § 3582, see Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub L No 98-473, 98
Stat 1998. Because nothing in the text or legislative history of 18 USC § 3582(c) suggests
that Congress intended to limit district courts' jurisdiction under § 2255, an argument
can be made that the former statute is irrelevant in the interpretation of the latter. Gordils v United States, 943 F Supp 346, 351 (S D NY 1996). However, the Gordils court did
not rely on this rationale in deciding that it had jurisdiction to resentence the movant. Id
at 352-53.
' Other jurisdictional issues arise from the language of § 2255. See Mixon v United
States, 926 F Supp 178, 181 (S D Ala 1996) (finding jurisdiction in language authorizing
the court to "correct the sentence"). Compare Warner v United States, 926 F Supp 1387,
1398 (E D Ark 1996) (holding that resentencing is unavailable to the government because
relief under § 2255 is available only to a "prisoner in custody"), with United States v Rowland, 1996 US Dist LEXIS 13377, *4 n 4 (E D Pa) (holding that the court can take into account the government's resentencing request).
See, for example, Woodhouse v United States, 934 F Supp 1008, 1012-13 (C D Ill
1996); Smith v United States, 103 F3d 531, 533 (7th Cir 1996). The Seventh Circuit in
Smith was the first circuit court of appeals to consider the permissibility of resentencing.
See, for example, Warner, 926 F Supp at 1397; Rodriguez v United States, 933 F
Supp 279, 284 (S D NY 1996).
"Some courts hold that the interdependence of the sentences gives the sentencing
court the "inherent authority" to adjust unchallenged counts. See, for example, Pedretti v
United States, 1996 US Dist LEXIS 6315, *5 (N D NY). 18 USC § 3582, the statute that
requires express statutory authorization before a court can modify a term of imprisonment, dispels any notion that a court can have "inherent authority" to resentence on unchallenged counts. Nonetheless, interdependence of the counts does support the view that
when a defendant challenges one count, he brings the entire sentencing package before
the court. See Merrittv United States, 930 F Supp 1109, 1113-14 (E D NC 1996).
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Courts permitting resentencing hold that a multi-count conviction involving a § 924(c)(1) count and an additional count or
counts produce an interdependent sentencing package. This is so
because the court could not have initially sentenced the defendant both on a § 924(c)(1) conviction and enhanced the defendant's other sentences under § 2D1.1(b)(1) of the Guidelines. 7 In
other words, the decision to sentence on the § 924(c)(1) conviction
affected the availability of the § 2D1.1(b)(1) enhancement, and
thus created an interdependence between the sentence on the
§ 924(c)(1) count and the sentences on the other counts. The fact
that the prosecutor either dropped certain charges or recommended more lenient sentencing in reliance on the defendant's
§ 924(c)(1) guilty plea also suggests interdependence.
However, one court has pointed out that the notion of an interdependent sentencing package developed in cases where the
defendant successfully challenged one of his counts on direct appeal and was resentenced on the remaining counts on remand, 8
not in cases involving a successful collateral attack.6 9 The two
contexts are not interchangeable, because they rest on different
statutory grants of jurisdiction. ° Thus, despite the interdependence between a § 924(c)(1) count and other counts, resentencing
may be deemed inappropriate due to the "narrow scope of review"
under § 2255."'
Merritt, 930 F Supp at 1114; Woodhouse, 934 F Supp at 1013. See Part IA. The
Seventh Circuit in Smith addressed the issue of whether the sentencing package principle, which developed before the Guidelines came on the scene, remains a viable concept
under the Guidelines. The Seventh Circuit concluded that, at least in the case of the
"either-or relationship" that exists between § 924(c)(1) and the § 2Dl.l(b)(1) enhancement, the sentencing package principle remains viable. Smith, 103 F3d at 534.
"See, for example, United States v Pimienta-Redondo, 874 F2d 9, 17 (1st Cir 1989);
UnitedStates v Shue, 825 F2d 1111, 1116 (7th Cir 1987).
Rodriguez, 933 F Supp at 284-85.
t0 The statutory grant of jurisdiction present in cases on remand after a direct appeal
is 28 USC § 2106 (1994), which permits "[tihe Supreme Court or any other court of appellate jurisdiction... [to] remand the cause and direct the entry of such appropriate
judgment, decree, or order, or require such further proceedings to be had as may be just
under the circumstances." See Rodriguez, 933 F Supp at 285.
' Rodriguez, 933 F Supp at 284, quoting United States v Rosen, 764 F2d 763, 766
(11th Cir 1985) (-The narrow scope of review on a collateral attack is almost jurisdictional
in nature. The court has power only over what is brought before it."). See also Beal v
United States, 924 F Supp 913, 917 (D Minn 1996) (distinguishing § 2255 proceedings
from cases in which resentencing occurs after vacatur and retrial for the same offense).
Compare also cases where a defendant challenges one of his sentences under FRCrP 35, a
context in which some courts have held that jurisdiction only extends to the illegal portion of the challenged "sentence." See United States v Henry, 709 F2d 298, 306-13 (5th Cir
1983) (en bane) (plurality opinion) (analyzing the history of Rule 35, the text of Rule 35,
and the meaning of the word "sentence"); United States v Minor, 846 F2d 1184, 1188-89
(9th Cir 1988) (following Henry). But see United States v Bentley, 850 F2d 327, 329 (7th
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Neither side's position on the proper definitional scope of a
"sentence" clearly resolves whether a court can permissibly enhance the defendant's sentence(s) on remaining valid counts. Although some precedent supports relying on the "sentencing
package" principle to find jurisdiction to resentence, that precedent developed in the context of a remand after direct appeal, a
context distinguishable insofar as it derives from a different
statute and concerns a different type of adjudicatory proceeding.
B. Double Jeopardy
Even if the court has jurisdiction to resentence the defendant
on the remaining valid counts, the gap in time between the initial sentencing and the later resentencing after a successful
§ 2255 motion raises double jeopardy concerns. 2 According to the
Supreme Court, "the Double Jeopardy Clause protects against
three distinct abuses: a second prosecution for the same offense
after acquittal; a second prosecution for the same offense after
conviction; and multiple punishments for the same offense." 3
The resentencing of a defendant after a successful § 2255 motion
raises concerns about the third of these abuses. While technically
two or more punishments doled out at different times could be
considered "multiple," the Supreme Court's double jeopardy jurisprudence suggests otherwise-a successive punishment is not
"multiple" unless the defendant has acquired a legitimate
"expectation of finality in the original sentence."74 Thus, a defendant who succeeds in his effort to set his original sentence aside
and receives a higher sentence after retrial cannot claim a double
jeopardy violation because one has no legitimate "expectation of
finality" in a sentence that one seeks to set aside. 5
Because a defendant can maintain no legitimate "expectation
of finality" in a sentence he attacks, the availability of a sentence
enhancement will turn on how broadly one defines "sentence."

Cir 1988) (holding that Rule 35 allows the court to revise the entire sentencing scheme).
' The Double Jeopardy Clause provides: "No person shall... be subject for the same
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." US Const, Amend V, cl 2.
" United States v Halper, 490 US 435, 440 (1989), citing North Carolinav Pearce, 395
US 711, 717 (1969).
' United States v DiFrancesco, 449 US 117, 139 (1980). For an analysis of DiFrancesco and the underlying values of the Double Jeopardy Clause, see Peter Westen,
The Three Faces of Double Jeopardy:Reflections on GovernmentAppeals of CriminalSentences, 78 Mich L Rev 1001 (1980).
' See DiFrancesco,449 US at 135-36, discussing Pearce, 395 US 711 (Pearce dealt
with resentencing after retrial, while DiFrancescoinvolved a new sentence after an appeal by the government from a court's sentencing determination.).
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Here, as with the jurisdictional issue,76 the courts permitting resentencing hold that a defendant who challenges one of several
interdependent sentences (or underlying convictions) has, in effect, challenged the entire "sentencing package" and thus cannot
maintain a legitimate expectation of finality in any discrete portion of the sentencing package, even a portion that he has not attacked.77
An alternative rationale for holding that resentencing does
not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause derives from the view
that failure to enhance the remaining counts after vacating the
§ 924(c)(1) sentence would effectively leave in place an incorrect
sentence. Because § 2D1.1(b)(1) mandates an enhancement when
a firearm was possessed unless a § 924(c)(1) violation is charged,
an incorrect sentence remains when the § 924(c)(1) count is removed.7 8 Because the Supreme Court has held that the Double
Jeopardy Clause is not violated when a court resentences
a defendant to correct an illegal sentence,79 imposing the
§ 2D1.1(b)(1) enhancement would be acceptable.
In contrast, the courts finding resentencing impermissible
reason that sentences are independent in the context of a § 2255
motion and thus define "sentence" more narrowly." One of these
courts acknowledges that, in the direct appeal context, the defendant may not have acquired a legitimate expectation of finality in his unchallenged sentences (or underlying convictions) by
the time they are enhanced on remand after an appeal.8 However, this court distinguishes a § 2255 motion from a direct appeal on the ground that the former's greater temporal distance
from the original sentencing and more narrow jurisdictional
scope enable the defendant to form a legitimate expectation of finality in the unchallenged counts.2

See Part lI.A.
Merritt v United States, 930 F Supp 1109, 1115 (E D NC 1996); Mixon v United
States, 926 F Supp 178, 180-81 (S D Ala 1996); Mayes v United States, 937 F Supp 659,
661 (E D Mich 1996); Woodhouse v United States, 934 F Supp 1008, 1014 (C D Jll 1996).
These courts rely on direct appeal cases for the "sentencing package" theory. See note 68
and accompanying text.
See Part I.A.
Bozza v United States, 330 US 160, 166-67 (1947).
Warner v United States, 926 F Supp 1387, 1393 (E D Ark 1996); Dossett v United
States, 931 F Supp 686, 687-88 (D SD 1996).
'1 Warner, 926 F Supp at 1393.
Warner, 926 F Supp at 1393-94 & n 11. Here again it is apparent that the jurisdiction and double jeopardy issues are interrelated.
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The view that resentencing does not violate the Double
Jeopardy Clause is slightly more persuasive. Although the issue
whether a defendant has acquired a legitimate expectation of finality' in his sentence is circular to some extent, there are several reasons why a defendant might not have an expectation of
finality in any discrete portion of his aggregate sentence.
First, the defendant could be charged with notice that the
§ 2D1.l(b)(1) enhancement was not applied originally due to the
presence of the § 924(c)(1) conviction and therefore that an interdependent relationship exists between the § 924(c)(1) count and
the other counts. The defendant might also be charged with notice of the cases holding that enhancing sentences on remaining
counts on remand after a direct appeal does not violate the Dou5 the Suble Jeopardy Clause. In United States v DiFrancesco,"
preme Court held that the defendant lacked an expectation of finality in a sentencing judgment from which the government appealed, reasoning that the defendant should be charged with notice of a statute that allowed the government to appeal from the
lower court's sentencing determination.86 There is no reason why
a post-Bailey § 2255 defendant could not similarly be charged
with notice of the Guidelines. Furthermore, it is the defendant,
not the government, who is instigating review of his sentence.
Thus, the defendant seems to have even less of a legitimate expectation of finality in his sentence than did the defendant in
DiFrancesco.
Yet this reasoning is not iron-clad. The statute at issue in
7 expressly stated that the government could appeal
DiFrancesco"
from the district court's sentencing determination, and that is
what the government did. However, neither the Guidelines, nor
' One factual situation-where the defendant has completed serving the sentence on
the count that the government requests the court to enhance-has provoked considerable
confusion among the courts, leading to diverse conclusions in dicta even among those
courts permitting resentencing. Thus, some courts hold (or state in dicta) that by virtue of
having completed the sentences on the counts that remain after the § 2255 motion, the
defendant has acquired a legitimate expectation of finality in those portions of his sentence that were lawful at the time that service of the sentences was completed, and thus
it would violate the defendant's double jeopardy rights to resentence him on those counts.
See Warner, 926 F Supp at 1394-95 (holding); United States v Tolson, 935 F Supp 17, 21
(D DC 1996) (dicta). Other courts hold that even a defendant who completes service of a
then-lawful sentence can receive an enhancement on that sentence after a successful
§ 2255 motion. See Merritt, 930 F Supp at 1114-15; Thayer v United States, 937 F Supp
662, 666-67 (E D Mich 1996).
United States v DiFrancesco,449 US 117, 139 (1980).
449 US 117 (1980).
Id at 139.
18 USC § 3576; see DiFrancesco,449 US at 138.
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any statute, nor any uniform body of precedent states that the
government may enhance remaining sentences or reinstate the
original indictment after a successful collateral attack.
C. Due Process
Resentencing a successful § 2255 defendant on his remaining
counts might violate the defendant's due process rights if doing
so would be fundamentally unfair. The Fourth Circuit, analyzing
the double jeopardy and due process protections available to a
previously sentenced defendant, noted that the DiFrancesco
Court had not clearly set forth the constitutional protections
against enhancement of the defendant's sentence after the sentence had commenced." To fill this gap, the Fourth Circuit set
forth a new protective standard grounded in the Due Process
Clause: "due process may ... be denied when a sentence is enhanced after the defendant has served so much of his sentence
that his expectations as to its finality have crystallized and it
would be fundamentally unfair to defeat them." 9
This due process test is virtually identical to the double
jeopardy analysis of whether the defendant had an "expectation
of finality" in his sentence. Courts permitting resentencing generally hold that a defendant who challenges part of an interdependent sentencing package lacks a "crystallized" expectation of
finality in any component of the package." In contrast, one court
held that by the time the defendant made his § 2255 motion,
such a substantial period of time had passed that the defendant's
expectations as to his sentence's finality had crystallized, so that
it would be fundamentally unfair to resentence him on the re"United States v Lundien, 769 F2d 981, 985 (4th Cir 1985). A court might also find a
due process violation under two other scenarios. First, a court might find that a prosecutor's motion to resentence constitutes prosecutorial vindictiveness. See North Carolina v
Pearce, 395 US 711, 725 (1969) ("Due process of law . . . requires that vindictiveness
against a defendant for having successfully attacked his first conviction must play no part
in the sentence he receives after a new trial."). Neither the courts permitting resentencing nor the courts that forbid resentencing have considered the implications of the Pearce
doctrine. Second, in a case where the defendant had already served his sentence and been
released, resentencing would re-deprive the defendant of his liberty, arguably without
adequate protection and thus in violation of the Due Process Clause. In Woodhouse, the
court held that further imprisonment of the defendant under these circumstances did not
violate the Due Process Clause. Woodhouse, 934 F Supp at 1015.
"Lundien, 769 F2d at 987. In Lundien, the government moved to amend the defendant's sentence five days after the defendant commenced serving it. Id. The court held
that the defendant's expectations had not crystallized within that brief five-day period.

Id.
See Part Il.B.
9' See, for example, Thayer, 937 F Supp at 667; Merritt, 930 F Supp at 1115.
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maining counts.92 One court splits the difference on this issue,
allowing for the two-point § 2D1.1(b)(1) enhancement but using
its downward departure power to subtract one point because the
defendant had served a significant portion of his original sentence.93
For the same reasons set forth in Part III.B of this Comment, discussing the similar double jeopardy test, the Fourth
Circuit's test does not clearly determine whether resentencing a
defendant on remaining counts violates the fundamental fairness
aspect of the Due Process Clause.
Looking back at the analysis of the resentencing remedy in
light of statutory and constitutional hurdles, one observes several
reasonably persuasive arguments favoring the permissibility of
resentencing. Admittedly, however, intelligent arguments
against the permissibility of the resentencing remedy also exist.
Unfortunately, the doctrine does not point to a clear answer. In
Part V, some first principles will be introduced into the analysis
to help inform the legal doctrine. But first it is necessary to consider the statutory and constitutional hurdles to the alternate
remedy of reinstating the original indictment.
IV.

PERMISSIBILITY OF REINSTATING THE ORIGINAL INDICTMENT

The government has made far fewer attempts to use the reinstatement remedy than the resentencing remedy.94 As a result,
the case law on the permissibility of the reinstatement remedy is
somewhat sparse. Nonetheless, three main obstacles facing the
reinstatement remedy can be identified: the statute of limitations, the Double Jeopardy Clause, and the Due Process Clause.

Warner, 926 F Supp at 1395-96.
United States v Ray, 1996 US Dist LEXIS 18091, *13 (D DC). Under the Guidelines,
a judge may depart downward from the applicable Guidelines range if the judge finds
that the case includes a mitigating circumstance that the Sentencing Commission did not
adequately consider. See USSG § 5K2.0, policy statement (quoting 18 USC § 3553(b)
(1994)). For other circumstances in which the judge may depart downward, see generally
Review of CriminalProcedure, 84 Georgetown L J at 1279-89 (cited in note 7).
'In fact, in situations where the plea agreement produced more than a lone
§ 924(c)(1) count making both resentencing and reinstatement feasible adjustment alternatives, the government generally prefers the resentencing remedy and only once preferred the reinstatement remedy. See Rodriguez v United States, 933 F Supp 279, 280
(S D NY 1996) (government sought restoration of the original indictment). Part V offers
an explanation of why the government seems to prefer the resentencing remedy to the
reinstatement remedy when both are available.
13
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A. The Statute of Limitations for Criminal Prosecutions
To see the importance of the statute of limitations in this
context,95 recall the Bailey timeline. A defendant may have pled
guilty to § 924(c)(1) six years before the Supreme Court decided
Bailey. After the defendant's collateral attack of his § 924(c)(1)
count succeeds, seven years may have elapsed since the date of
the offense. Because the statute of limitations for noncapital
criminal offenses is five years, the defendant can argue that re.nstatement of the original indictment is barred. Thus, depending
upon whether or not a court is willing to toll the statute of limitations, the reinstatement remedy could be constrained to those defendants whose successful collateral attacks occur within five
years of the date of the offense.
In United States v Gaither, the court held that, under circumstances like those described above, the statute of limitations
barred reinstatement of the original indictment. 6 The court reasoned that the purpose of the statute of limitations is to protect
accused persons "from having to defend themselves against
charges when the basic facts may have become obscured by the
passage of time."97 The court declined to accept the government's
argument that, because it proceeded with diligence and was not
responsible for the lapse of five years, the statute of limitations
should be tolled. The court did observe that a refusal to toll the
statute of limitations might encourage defendants to wait strategically until five years had expired before bringing collateral attacks. But the court found that concern not present in the scechange in the law
nario presented by Bailey because an "abrupt
99
...cannot be anticipated by defendants."
The opposite conclusion was reached in United States v
0
in which the court tolled the statute of limitations to alViera,"'
low the prosecutor to reinstate the original indictment.' The
court reasoned that the defendant's collateral attack upset what
the government reasonably understood to be a final disposition of
"' 18 USC § 3282 (1994) is the general statute of limitations for noncapital criminal
offenses. It requires that the indictment be "found" within five years of the date of the offense. Id. The statute of limitations for criminal prosecutions is relevant for reinstatement but not for resentencing. This is because the resentencing remedy involves previ-

ously entered convictions rather than unproven counts.
926 F Supp 50, 53 (M D Pa 1996).
7 Id.
9Id.

Id at 54.
931 F Supp 1224 (M D Pa 1996).
...
Id at 1231.
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a criminal matter."2 The court also expressed concern that to fail
to toll the statute of limitations would confer a "windfall" on the
defendant.' The court disagreed with the Gaither court's assertion that courts are bound to apply the statute of limitations because Congress did not enact a good faith exception, and provided
several examples where courts had tolled the statute of limitations.0 4
In evaluating the rationales offered by these two courts in
support of their conclusions, one must concede that courts have
tolled statutes of limitations in other contexts. For example,
courts have permitted indictments to be timely filed under seal
for valid prosecutorial reasons and then made public after the
limitations period had expired even though this technically gives
the defendant notice after the limitations period.' 5 In such a
situation, the defendant certainly is at a disadvantage in marshaling fresh evidence in his favor, and yet the prosecutorial interest in secrecy was held to outweigh the defendant's interest.
Similarly, in the post-Bailey cases, tolling the statute of limitations would hinder the defendant's ability to present a defense
but arguably would be justified by the government's interest in
prosecuting the defendant anew and the government's lack of
fault for the delay.0 6
It is true that the primary purpose of the statute of limitations is to protect defendants from having to defend themselves

2
Id at 1230-31.
" 'Id at 1231. Part V of this Comment fleshes out the windfall concern in greater de-

0'

tail.

Viera, 931 F Supp at 1231.
"See United States v Levine, 658 F2d 113, 120-21 n 9 (3d Cir 1981); United States v

:c4

Muse, 633 F2d 1041, 1042 (2d Cir 1980) (en banc); United States v Michael, 180 F2d 55,
56-57 (3d Cir 1949).
"However, the Second Circuit recently offered the first court of appeals decision concerning a closely analogous issue and concluded that the statute of limitations cannot be
tolled in the case of a defendant who withdraws his guilty plea in light of a change in the
law. United States v Podde, 1997 US App LEXIS 1593 (2d Cir) (involving plea to lesser
included offense withdrawn by defendant after subsequent Supreme Court decision requiring a higher standard of mental state for that offense, followed by government's attempt to reinstate the original charges after the statute of limitations had run). The court
noted that one rationale for the statute of limitations, encouraging diligence by the government, was not threatened in such a pattern because the government could not have
acted more diligently in light of the unforeseen change in the law and subsequent plea
withdrawal. However, the court characterized that rationale of the statute of limitations
as subsidiary to the principal rationale of protecting defendants from having to defend
against stale claims. Id at *17. The court also cited a Supreme Court directive that
"criminal limitations statutes are to be liberally interpreted in favor of repose." Id at *18,
quoting Toussie v United States, 397 US 112, 114-15 (1970).
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from charges resting on facts obscured by time.' ° However, there
is no reason why a court could not weigh this interest of the defendant against the government's interest in prosecuting the defendant anew.
B. Double Jeopardy
As noted above, the Double Jeopardy Clause protects defendants against a number of different abuses.' The reinstatement
remedy implicates two of these abuses. First, the protection
against multiple punishment for the same offense, discussed in
relation to the resentencing remedy in Part III.B, applies similarly here. Only one court has addressed this aspect of double
jeopardy protection, holding that the reinstatement remedy does
not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.0 9 Relying on the notion
that "[a] defendant has no legitimate expectation of finality in a
sentence that he attacks" and also on the notion that a plea
agreement produces one aggregate sentence, the court reasoned
that the defendant had "open[ed] himself up to conviction and
sentence on all counts, including those previously dismissed.""0
However, the analysis of courts holding that the resentencing
remedy violates the Double Jeopardy Clause suggests that the
defendant's collateral attack could also be viewed as an isolated
attack on the § 924(c)(1) sentence."'
Second, the reinstatement remedy implicates the protection
against a "second prosecution for the same offense after conviction.""' No post-Bailey court has yet considered this aspect of
double jeopardy protection. In Ricketts v Adamson,"' the Supreme Court held that, when the plea agreement expressly provided that the original indictment could be reinstated upon a
breach by the defendant, the Double Jeopardy Clause did not
preclude the government from reprosecuting a defendant who
had breached a condition of his plea agreement." However, as
Part II concluded, a proper contract law analysis demonstrates
that the defendant's collateral attack does not constitute a
breach. Therefore, Ricketts is inapposite. Nonetheless, rein-

" See note 97 and accompanying text.
"+See text accompanying note 73.
" United States u Barron, 940 F Supp 1489, 1496 (D Alaska 1996).
..Id, citing Pennsylvaniav Goldhammer,474 US 28 (1985); DiFrancesco,449 US 117.
...
See notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
United States v Halper,490 US 435, 440 (1989).
1483
US 1 (1987).
114
Id at 9.
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statement of the original indictment does not violate this aspect
of double jeopardy protection.'1 5
C. Due Process
When the government responds to the defendant's successful
collateral attack on his § 924(c)(1) conviction by reinstating the
original indictment, including counts that had been dropped pursuant to the plea agreement, the defendant could argue that this
reprosecution violates his due process right to be free from prosecutorial vindictiveness." 6 In Blackledge v Perry,"' the key case
recognizing this protection, a state prosecutor responded to a defendant's exercise of his statutory right to appeal"' by bringing a
more serious charge against him prior to the trial de novo." s The
Supreme Court, recognizing that prosecutors had a considerable
stake in discouraging convicted misdemeanants from appealing
from proceedings in courts not of record, held that this practice
violated the Due Process Clause. 2 °
Although the statutory right to make a collateral attack in
post-Bailey cases is analogous to the statutory right to a trial de
novo in Blackledge, the practice challenged in Blackledge is distinguishable from the reinstatement remedy in the post-Bailey
scenario. Unlike the Blackledge prosecutor's practice of bringing
a more serious charge, the reinstatement remedy does not allow
the government to bring more serious charges, but only to reinstate the counts present in the original indictment that were
dismissed pursuant to the plea agreement.
However, upon reinstatement of the indictment and consequent plea negotiation (or trial) and sentencing hearing, the government may be constrained to seek a sentence equal to the
overall length of the initial sentence with credit given for time
served. When the defendant's overall sentence is increased and

"' See United States v Tateo, 377 US 463, 468 (1964) (holding retrial permissible when
conviction declared invalid on collateral attack). See also United States v Podde, 1997 US
App LEXIS 1593, *13 (2d Cir) (holding that when the defendant "repudiates" the plea
bargain there is no double jeopardy obstacle to retrying him on the charges in the original
indictment).
..The "fundamental fairness" due process test also potentially applies here. Because
the analysis is identical to that for the resentencing remedy in Part lI.C (and similarly
inconclusive), it is not repeated here.
117417 US 21 (1974).
.. After being convicted of a misdemeanor in the state District Court, the defendant
had a statutory right to a trial de novo in the Superior Court. Id at 22.
"'Idat 23.
Id at 27-29.
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when there is a "reasonable likelihood" that the increased sentence is the product of actual vindictiveness, a rebuttable presumption of vindictiveness is raised. 2 ' If the prosecutor lacks any
new information logically relevant to sentencing that would justify an increase from the initial aggregate sentence, the prosecutor would not be able to rebut the presumption.
None of these obstacles facing the reinstatement remedy
seems insurmountable. With regard to the statute of limitations
issue, there are persuasive arguments both ways.'22 The challenges to the reinstatement remedy raised by the Double Jeopardy and Due Process Clauses do not clearly defeat it, even if
they might constrain it. Part V appeals to some first principles of
criminal law for guidance in determining whether resentencing
or reinstatement should be permissible.
V. FIRST PRINCIPLES

Thus far, this Comment has examined whether two sentence
adjustment remedies, resentencing and reinstatement, comport
with principles of contract law, the court's jurisdiction, the statute of limitations, the Double Jeopardy Clause, and the Due
Process Clause. None of these legal doctrines has provided unequivocal answers. Even if one concludes that resentencing and
reinstatement are unquestionably permissible, it does not necessarily follow that the government should make use of them.
This final Part seeks to provide guidance from a broader
policy perspective, comparing society's interest in punishing
criminals proportionately to their culpable conduct with the defendant's interest in avoiding an upward adjustment of the sentence that remains after his successful collateral attack." The
"Alabama v Smith, 490 US 794, 799 (1989). However, Smith suggests that the
Blackledge presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness might not even apply in the situation of a vacated guilty plea followed by a higher sentence upon conviction after retrial.
Smith held that the Pearce presumption of judicial vindictiveness would not apply in this
scenario. 490 US at 803. While the Smith Court did not mention Blackledge, a strong argument can be made that the Smith holding would be carried over to the prosecutorial
vindictiveness context. Even if it were, however, the defendant could still claim there was
actual vindictiveness on the part of the prosecutor. See 490 US at 803 (declining to reach
the question whether the facts supported a finding of actual vindictiveness on the part of
the sentencing judge).
'Even if one concludes that the statute of limitations cannot be tolled, the reinstatement remedy would be available if the statute of limitations had not yet run.
'This approach is suggested by Ronald Dworkin, who argues that judges, in reading
legal doctrine, must achieve a "fit" with precedent. In "hard cases," more than one possible reading achieves this "fit." In such cases, Dworkin suggests that the judge should
choose the approach that is most justified on grounds of principle. See Ronald Dworkin,
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analysis proceeds in two stages. The first stage examines the
merit of the two adjustment mechanisms in the task of "cleaning
up the mess" created by Bailey. The second stage contemplates
the importance and relevance of post-collateral attack sentence
adjustment beyond the post-Bailey context.
A. Cleaning up the Bailey Mess
The immediate effect of a successful Bailey-inspired collateral attack is to cut the defendant's sentence by five years. 24
True, the defendant should not be punished for "active employment" of a firearm when the facts did not support such a plea (or
verdict). But the five-year reduction undoubtedly leaves some
conduct unpunished that the law still deems criminal. 2 ' Most
obviously, the § 2DL.(b)(1) enhancement for mere possession of
a firearm in relation to a narcotics offense has not yet been applied, for the presence of the now-vacated § 924(c)(1) conviction
at the initial sentencing precluded the use of the § 2D1.1(b)(1)
enhancement on the other counts. Further, in the context of a
plea agreement in which the prosecutor dismissed certain counts
from the indictment in reliance on the defendant's guilty plea to
§ 924(c)(1), the prosecutor made a calculated decision to "pin" the
culpable conduct covered by those dismissed counts on the
§ 924(c)(1) count. In short, failure to adjust the defendant's remaining sentence upward gives the defendant, in the words of
several courts, a "windfall." 2 6
Does this windfall matter? Several theories of punishment
suggest that it does. Consider first the theory of cost-justified deterrence, which states that society should deter criminal conduct
by imposing a penalty and enforcement mechanism up to the
point where the marginal cost of the punishment scheme equals
the marginal benefit of avoided criminal conduct.'27 If the defenTaking Rights Seriously 86-88 (Harvard 1978); Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire 216-28,
244 (Harvard 1986).
'This is because § 924(c)(1) prescribes that its five-year sentence must be served
consecutively to any other sentence. 18 USC § 924(c)(1).
' This Comment assumes that the judgment of the Sentencing Commission in specifying a punishment schedule for differing degrees of criminal conduct, and of the prosecutor in deciding what criminal conduct he intends to "pin" on one count by dismissing
other counts, reflects society's view of appropriate punishment.
"See Gaither,926 F Supp at 54; Viera, 931 F Supp at 1231.
'Punishment consists of two components: (1) probability that punishment will be
imposed and (2) severity of the punishment. To deter an individual defendant from committing a particular crime, a probability-severity combination must be selected that exceeds the defendant's perceived benefit from committing the crime. If the cost of this
punishment is less than the benefit to society from deterring the criminal act, then cost-
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dant's sentence is not adjusted upward, then criminals at large
may perceive that society has decided to punish leniently "drugand gun-related" criminal activity. 2 ' Thus, if the prosecutor's
litigation costs in seeking the upward adjustment are less than
the benefits of the increased deterrent effect on (potential) criminals, then cost-justified deterrence favors allowing upward adjustment.'2 9 From the standpoint of the "just deserts" theory of
punishment, society frowns on letting the defendant off the hook
for the conduct of possessing a gun in a drug transaction (and
any other conduct covered by counts if such counts were dismissed pursuant to a plea agreement). Thus, both theories favor
allowing an upward adjustment of the defendant's sentence.
Concerning the defendant's interest, the post-Bailey defendants can make colorable arguments against upward adjustment
based on the Double Jeopardy and Due Process Clauses. And it
can be conceded that an upward adjustment of the defendant's
remaining sentence is a net increase in the lawfully imposed
component of the defendant's sentence, for the § 924(c)(1) conviction should never have occurred in the first place.
However, the defendant's arguments lose force when one
considers what "sentence adjustment" term the parties would
have agreed to if they had taken into account the risk of a change
in the interpretation of § 924(c)(1) during the plea negotiation.
Although this exercise may seem somewhat fanciful, it has been
used in other contractual contexts.3 0 Suppose that the risk of a
change in the law had been foreseeable because a clear conflict

justified deterrence suggests that the punishment scheme be instituted. See generally
Richard A. Posner, EconomicAnalysis of Law § 7.2 at 223-31 (Little, Brown 4th ed 1992).
'This deterrence account is based on the assumption that the potential criminals
mistakenly perceive a bar on resentencing as a reduction in the penalty that they will receive if convicted. Under a correct analysis by a potential criminal, the disposition of the
post-Bailey defendants should have little effect on expected punishment. Rather, Bailey
itself lowers the expected penalty for drug activity associated with mere possession of a
gun. The § 2Dl.l(b)(1) enhancement should still enter the potential criminal's expected
punishment, but it does not if the potential criminal mistakenly concludes that because
the § 2D1.l(b)(1) enhancement is not being retroactively applied to prisoners who vacate
their § 924(c)(1) convictions, it will not be applied in the first instance to his own sentence.
'Another factor that enters the cost-justified deterrence calculus is the "specific deterrence" benefit of keeping the post-Bailey defendant off the streets where he might return to criminal activity.
'The "would have wanted" theory of filling gaps in contracts states that courts
should supply the terms that the parties to a contract would have negotiated, were the
costs of negotiating at arm's length sufficiently low. See Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel
R. Fischel, The Economic Structure of CorporateLaw 22-35 (Harvard 1991) (discussing
the role of corporate law as filling gaps in contracts).
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among the circuits existed concerning the interpretation of
§ 924(c)(1) at the time of the plea negotiation, with some circuits
adopting a "mere possession" standard and others adopting an
"active employment" standard. Suppose further that the facts
demonstrate only "mere possession" of a firearm but support a
host of other narcotics counts, a reasonable assumption in many
31
cases.
The prosecutor would then have formulated his plea negotiation strategy taking into account the risk that a five-year sentence associated with a § 924(c)(1) count could be vacated. Accordingly, the prosecutor would either insist on a term allowing
for sentence adjustment in the event the law did change, or else
seek more diverse charges 32 so that a future vacatur of the
§ 924(c)(1) count would only reduce the sentence to the level that
the prosecutor would seek to obtain in the absence of any risk of
a change in law. The prosecutor might have presented the defendant with a choice of the following options: "(1) In the event of a
change in the law, you can move to vacate your § 924(c)(1) count,
but you must agree to allow the government to adjust your sentence upward to reflect unpunished criminal conduct;3 3 or (2) If
you do not agree to this adjustment upon a successful collateral
attack, you must plead guilty to a § 924(c)(1) count and other
counts that will make your sentence longer than it would be under option (1)."
Thus, the defendant would choose either a shorter sentence
accompanied by a risk of being subjected to an upward sentence
adjustment upon a successful collateral attack of the § 924(c)(1)
count, or a longer sentence accompanied by no risk of future sentence adjustment upon a successful collateral attack. Empirical
evidence has shown that, relative to the general population,
criminals are risk-preferring"'4-- all else equal, criminals prefer a
"See, for example, Thayer v United States, 937 F Supp 662, 663 (E D Mich 1996)
(plea agreement to counts of conspiracy to distribute, possession with intent to distribute,
use of a firearm in relation to a drug offense, and possession with intent to distribute
marijuana, among others).
" Diversity of charges is necessary to produce a longer aggregate sentence, for closely
related counts will be grouped under the Guidelines. See note 8 and accompanying text.
" Such a term would likely be upheld in court. See Ricketts, 483 US at 9 (upholding
term in plea agreement that stated that in the event of a breach by the defendant, the
government could reinstate the original indictment).
"AMichael K. Block and Vernon E. Gerety, Some Experimental Evidence on Differences Between Student and PrisonerReactions to Monetary Penaltiesand Risk, 24 J Legal
Stud 123, 138 (1995) (conducting experiments and concluding that "there is a significant
difference between criminals and the general population in their willingness to accept

risk").
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higher degree of risk to a longer sentence. Because option (1) offers a shorter sentence with more risk than option (2), most
criminal defendants are likely to choose option (1), the option
that allows sentence adjustment upon a successful collateral attack." 5 Therefore, the defendant would have agreed to allow sentence adjustment had the parties taken into account the possibility of a change in the law." 6
Once one decides that an upward adjustment of the defendant's sentence is legally permissible and normatively desired, it
remains to choose an upward adjustment mechanism. The resentencing and reinstatement remedies are not equivalent in cost or
effect. Resentencing offers a quick, low-cost method of bumping
up the defendant's sentence. First, the parties have already convened in the district court for the § 2255 hearing. Second, application of the § 2D1.1(b)(1) enhancement is a sentencing issue and
therefore is decided by the judge rather than the jury. Third, the
judge will quickly be able to make a finding on whether the defendant possessed a firearm based on the record of the case,
given that the pre-Bailey courts based the original § 924(c)(1)
conviction on the conduct of possession of a firearm. The disadvantage of resentencing is that it may not suffice to punish the
defendant for conduct that the prosecutor decided to "pin" on the
§ 924(c)(1) plea when he dismissed other counts pursuant to the
plea agreement.
While reinstatement of the original indictment offers the
chance to achieve a closer fit to the punishment that the defendant would have received if convicted in the post-Bailey world, it
requires a new plea bargaining session (and if that fails, a new
trial) and thus poses considerable litigation costs for the prosecutor. Most likely, this explains why the government has almost
uniformly pursued the resentencing remedy rather than the reinstatement remedy in the post-Bailey cases involving plea
agreements. Because the prosecutor has the best information on

'As an empirical matter, the analysis may be more complex. Whether criminals
choose (1) or (2) may depend on how risk-averse they are, and how likely a change in the
law is.
'MAn argument might be made that the waivable background rule should be that sentence adjustment will not occur. This would act as a penalty default, putting the burden
of factoring the risk of a change in the law or successful collateral attack on the prosecutor, for arguably the prosecutor, as a repeat player, has a lower cost than defense counsel
of predicting such a change in the law. However, it is not clear that the prosecutor has a
better read on trends in the law than the public defender's office. More importantly, the
'penalty" of releasing culpable defendants that would result from the proposed penalty
default rule would perhaps be too severe in its effects on society.
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the litigation costs involved with these different remedies and
because the doctrine can plausibly be read to permit both remedies, 37 courts should allow the prosecutor to choose the remedial
strategy.
B. Looking Forward: Beyond the Post-Bailey Context
The normative thesis of this Comment is that whenever a
change in the substantive criminal law precipitates a collateral
attack resulting in a sentence that does not reflect all of the defendant's culpable conduct, an upward adjustment should be
permitted within the doctrinal limits discussed in Parts III and
IV. Thus, this thesis applies when four elements exist: a change
in the substantive criminal law, a successful collateral attack, a
consequent reduction in sentence, and a remaining sentence that
does not reflect all of the defendant's criminal conduct.
The first element, a change in the substantive criminal law,
has occurred in the past and undoubtedly will occur in the future. The second element, a successful collateral attack, will
likely follow from a change in the law where the prospect of a reduced sentence (the third element) provides the defendant with
an incentive to make such a motion. In this respect, the Bailey
situation is somewhat unique in that it imposes a mandatory
five-year sentence consecutive to sentences on other counts. The
more usual treatment of multi-count convictions under the
Guidelines is to group counts for the purpose of calculating the
offense level where the counts involve substantially the same
harm. 3 ' However, two other statutes similarly mandate a consecutive sentence'39 and others might be enacted in the future. A
change in the interpretation of any of these statutes might lead
to a reduction in sentence. Further, even with grouped counts involving substantially the same harm, the Guidelines prescribe an
enhancement in some cases. 4 ° A vacatur of one of these counts
could remove such an enhancement and thus reduce the sentence. The fourth element, a remaining sentence that does not reflect all of the defendant's criminally culpable conduct, would
seem to exist in most cases of a conviction resulting from a plea
agreement, for the now-vacated count no longer serves as the
"vehicle" for punishing the defendant for conduct covered by the
previously dismissed counts.
" See Parts TI-IV.
-USSG §§ 3D1.1(a), 3D1.2.

1

18 USC §§ 844(h), 929(b) (1994).
USSG § 3D1.4.

1096

The University of ChicagoLaw Review

CONCLUSION

Prosecutors seek to allocate their resources to punish defendants for conduct that society finds worthy of punishment.
Changes in the substantive criminal law unsettle the punishment scheme that a prosecutor has devised for a particular defendant. A new interpretation of the substantive criminal law, an
interpretation favorable to defendants, is a statement that the
law no longer considers the defendant's conduct to be as deserving of punishment as it once did. Where such a change was unexpected, the defendant should be given the opportunity to have
the court reexamine his sentence. The collateral attack statute
rightly provides him with this opportunity.
However, the law should not reward defendants with a windfall. Society has a strong interest in punishing defendants proportionately to their criminally culpable conduct. Accordingly,
when a defendant has brought a successful collateral attack as a
result of a change in the law, the prosecutor should be able to
choose between resentencing and reinstating the indictment.
While doctrines such as jurisdiction, due process, double jeopardy, and statutes of limitations may appear to present obstacles
to such a course, a closer examination reveals that they are not
dispositive. The flexible remedy defended by this Comment helps
to ensure the proper relationship between the conduct and the
sentence.

